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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has grown to a level of global importance almost
overnight.1 By now, the statistics are common knowledge but staggering
nonetheless. The Internet swelled from a state of general anonymity in
1990 to a projected 320 million users in 2002.2 In accordance with this
monumental growth, the Internet has been groundbreaking for
commerce. By 1998, twenty percent of U.S. households had made a
purchase online.3
The Internet is important not only because of its popularity, but also
because of its power for innovation.4 The Internet has caused an
explosion of new services and innovative types of commerce.5 The
Internet has also changed the contours of the marketplace, creating a
connected economy in which anyone with a computer and a phone line
can do business directly with a maker of goods anywhere in the world
and at any time.6 The Internet has even changed consumers themselves,
empowering them with unlimited information about products.7 The
Internet has also changed the relationship that consumers have with
products created and distributed by digital technology, such as computer
programs. In a transaction dealing with digital information, consumers
purchase access to information products rather than the products
themselves.8 This access is purchased in the form of a license.9
1. See FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE 87 (1997) (noting that the
Internet went from a state of general anonymity in 1990 to an estimated 57 million users
in 1997).
2. KEITH BROWN, THE INTERACTIVE MARKETPLACE 32 fig.1–3 (2001). Almost
half of the households in the U.S. have Internet connections. See id. at 29 fig.1–2.
3. Id. Forrester Research, a market research firm, estimated that by 2003,
business sales online will reach $1.3 trillion, or 9.4% of total business sales. JEREMY
RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS 18 (2000).
4. See CAIRNCROSS, supra note 1, at 87.
5. See id. The Internet has been especially important for intangible products,
such as airline tickets, stocks, music, news, and insurance policies. See WENDY CURRIE,
THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY 120 (2000). These items, which are in essence just
information, can now be bought, sold, and transferred over the Internet. See id. This
digital delivery is bound to permanently change commerce. See id.
6. See RIFKIN, supra note 3, at 18–19; CAIRNCROSS, supra note 1, at 125–26.
7. BROWN, supra note 2, at 62–64 (noting that with the vast amount of
information made available by the Internet, consumers will know all the aspects of a
purchase, creating a “transparent” marketplace where no information is privileged).
8. Andrew R. Basile & Alex P. Paul, Mass Market License Agreements, in
PATENT & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 407, 409 (PLI Intellectual Prop. Course,
Handbook Series No. G–652, 2001), available at WL 652 PLI/Pat 407; see infra notes
29–40 and accompanying text.
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The growth of the Internet has all of the signs of a revolution, with
some people looking forward to the possibilities of the digital future and
others yearning for the relative certainty of the brick and mortar past.10
In light of this new technology, a basic question has arisen about how
law should apply to economic activity taking place in the digital realm.11
This Comment highlights one corner of that discussion—contractual
assent on the Internet. In its broadest sense, contractual assent on the
Internet refers to any agreement that is made using the digital
communication enabled by the Internet.12 The Internet has made it very
easy for people to enter into contracts. Many of these contracts are
licenses. This Comment explores the enforceability of so-called browsewrap agreements as a means of creating licenses on the Internet.
Browse-wrap refers to a mass market license agreement13 that is
formed on a Web site.14 The key feature of browse-wrap, and the source
of its legal uncertainty, is that it does not force a potential licensee to
undertake an act that explicitly expresses an intent to enter into the
license, such as clicking “I agree.”15 A browse-wrap license is
sometimes displayed directly on a Web site’s initial page or on a link
within the site.16 Users are asked to read the agreement and assent
before using the information that is the topic of the license.
Browse-wrap licenses are typically used to create licenses for
information products available on the Internet.17 Browse-wrap might
9. A license is defined as “leave to do a thing which the licensor would otherwise
have a right to prevent.” W. Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d
Cir. 1930). A license is a contract in which the buyer is given the permission to use the
product, but is not given ownership of the product. See infra notes 29–40 and
accompanying text.
10. See Raymond T. Nimmer, International Information Transactions: An Essay
on Law in an Information Society, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 5, 6 (2000).
11. Id.
12. For example, if a computer program is purchased from a Web site, some action
during the sale, such as clicking an “I Agree” button or giving a credit card number,
indicates assent by the buyer. This assent is given on the Internet.
13. A mass market licensing agreement is a form contract that details the terms of
a licensing agreement. Because it is a form contract, the individual terms of the license
cannot be bargained for. See infra notes 29–48 and accompanying text.
14. See Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
15. See id.
16. See id. The site in Pollstar had a notice on the home page that a license
existed. The notice was also a link to the actual text of the license. See id.
17. An information product is a product that communicates an idea. It cannot be
held or touched. It is intangible information. Computer software falls in this category.
See Raymond T. Nimmer, UCITA: A Commercial Contract Code, COMPUTER LAW., May
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come in the form of a license limiting the liability of a Web site that
gives out free software programming tips. Browse-wrap might also
appear as a license regulating the use of free games offered on a Web
site.
Several years ago, it seemed that browse-wrap would be enforced
along with other types of digital assent.18 However, two recent cases
have brought the fate of browse-wrap into question.
In Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., a California district court
refused to enforce a browse-wrap license on Ticketmaster’s Web site.19
The license prohibited users from using the site for commercial purposes
and from “deep linking” to the site.20 The browse-wrap agreement was
displayed on the bottom of the site’s main page, but the court reasoned
that consumers were not given proper notice of the license.21
Similarly, in Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., a New York
district court refused to enforce a browse-wrap license agreement that
Netscape attached to its free software.22 The browse-wrap license was
indicated by a link on the same page users visited to download the
software and included a forum selection clause that would apply to
anyone using the free software distributed by Netscape.23 The court
found that the users of the software did not assent to the license because
the users did not have proper notice of its existence and consequently the
users had done nothing to indicate assent.24
2000, at 3, 5. The communicative aspect of computer software is problematic for policy
makers because it brings up issues of freedom of speech and information policy. See id.
18. See Pollstar, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (declining to declare browse-wrap invalid
because of a recent ruling validating other licensing agreements); Dawn Davidson,
Comment, Click and Commit: What Terms Are Users Bound to When They Enter Web
Sites?, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1171, 1186–87 (2000) (noting that the policies behind
recent developments in the law of licensing bode well for licenses posted on Web sites,
but also suggesting that these cases offer little insight into what sort of notice is required
for a valid agreement).
19. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 54 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1344, 1346 (C.D.
Cal. 2000).
20. Id. Deep linking is the practice of using a hyperlink to send a user to the
interior of another site rather than the new site’s front page. For example, users of the
Tickets.com site were taken directly into Ticketmaster’s site, not the front page of the
site as Ticketmaster would have preferred. Id. at 1345–46.
21. See id at 1346 (“Many customers instead are likely to proceed to the event
page of interest rather than reading the ‘small print.’ It cannot be said that merely
putting the terms and conditions in this fashion necessarily creates a contract with any
one [sic] using the web site.”). The idea that a contract’s terms must be clearly
represented to the agreeing parties is tied to the concept of procedural unconscionability,
which holds that it is unfair to enforce contracts with terms that are couched in the fine
print or otherwise unfairly concealed. See infra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.
22. Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d. 585, 595
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
23. See id. at 595–96.
24. Id. at 595.
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The Ticketmaster and Specht decisions highlight a distressing trend
toward restricting the formation of contracts on the Internet, all in the
name of consumer protection. This trend runs counter to the increasing
validation of shrink-wrap licenses25 and click-wrap licenses26 as well as
the policy goals of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA), a uniform set of laws created explicitly for electronic
transactions.27 The trend is also dangerous to the rapid growth of digital
technology. Any unnecessary restrictions on digital contracting could
have negative effects on the development of future technologies.28
This Comment analyzes the enforceability of browse-wrap licenses
and argues that courts should uphold browse-wrap licenses. Part II lays
out the fundamentals of mass market licensing agreements. Part III
outlines the current state of the law concerning browse-wrap’s
predecessors: shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements. Part IV discusses
the UCITA view on mass market licenses by examining its general
policies and some relevant provisions. Part V delves into the policy
issues surrounding mass market agreements. Part VI offers a detailed
analysis of browse-wrap and its benefits. Finally, Part VII recommends
that courts carefully consider the benefits of browse-wrap agreements
before ruling against them and advises legislatures to consider adopting
some form of the UCITA.
II. MASS MARKET LICENSE AGREEMENTS
To understand the debate over browse-wrap licenses, it is important to
understand mass market licenses generally. A license is generally
defined as “leave to do a thing which the licensor would otherwise have
a right to prevent.”29 A mass market license is a form contract that
accompanies many information products, such as software, and outlines
the ways the products can be used.30 Mass market license agreements
25. See infra notes 70–85 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 86–91 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the UCITA, see generally Brian D. McDonald, The
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461 (2001).
28. The future of digital technology is uncertain, and unnecessary regulation could
have unforeseen effects on the progress of new technologies. One such technology, the
automated “bot” that can be programmed to buy and sell items on its own over the
Internet, is already being threatened by over regulation of Internet contracting. See infra
notes 202–05 and accompanying text.
29. W. Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1930).
30. See Stephen T. Keohane, Mass Market Licensing, in PATENT & HIGH
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arose out of the necessities of burgeoning digital technologies.31 In
typical information license agreements, the licensor retains ownership of
the information and grants permission for the use of the information.32
For example, in the sale of a computer program, the buyer does not get
ownership of the program code, the buyer purchases the right to use the
software.33 In many ways, “licenses serve not only to document legal
terms governing the transaction, but actually define the very ‘product’
that is the subject of the transaction. They are thus central to the
commercialization of software, information and other digital commodities.”34
Licenses are also used in contexts outside of information products.35
In order for licenses to be useful in a mass market, the agreements
cannot be individually negotiated—they must be standardized.36 These
agreements allow sellers to offer consumers high-end products at
relatively low prices.37 The use of licenses also allows distributors of
information to avoid the first sale doctrine that allows purchasers of
copyrighted works to resell or give the work away.38 Software vendors
also use licenses to protect noncopyrighted information by limiting the

TECHNOLOGY LICENSING, supra note 8, at 437, 443, available at WL 652 PLI/Pat 437.
Mass market licenses are not limited to software; they are also used for other items that
require mass distribution, such as computers. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d
1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
31. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass
Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335, 338–41
(1996) (discussing the history of license agreements in the computer industry).
32. Basile & Paul, supra note 8, at 409.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Licenses are often used to outline warranties or other terms for tangible goods,
such as computer hardware. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148 (involving a license covering a
computer).
36. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 31, at 342. Standard forms
allow distributors to sell products cheaply by lowering transactions costs that would
come from negotiating the terms of every sale. If a software program costs
$100,000,000 to produce and 1,000,000 people want it, the seller only needs to sell it for
$100 to break even. This low cost can only be maintained if transaction costs are low.
Mass market licenses facilitate low transaction costs by allowing for mass distribution
without having to negotiate each sale. Id.
37. Id.
38. Scott J. Spooner, The Validation of Shrink-Wrap and Click-Wrap Licenses by
Virginia’s Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 27, ¶ 6
(2001), at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i3/article1.html. The first sale doctrine means
that under U.S. copyright law, the buyers of a copyrighted work have the right to transfer
that copy in any way they see fit. See id. For example, the buyer of a book can resell the
book to anyone for any price after the initial sale. Computer programs are copyrighted
works. Since computer programs can be passed around and loaded onto an infinite
number of computers, it is important to software makers to avoid the first sale doctrine.
This is achieved by characterizing the transaction not as a sale, but as an issuance of a
license to use the product. See id.
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ways it can be used.39 Finally, licenses allow sellers to practice price
discrimination by charging different prices for different uses of the
product.40
The most common type of mass market licensing agreement is a
predecessor to browse-wrap known as the shrink-wrap license.41 The
simplest form of shrink-wrap licenses display the terms of the agreement
on the package of the product, visible through a cellophane wrapper.
The licensee assents to the agreement by simply opening the shrinkwrap.42 Some shrink-wrap licenses have a notice on the outside of the
box indicating that a license exists and that the terms of the agreement
are inside the product; these terms are impossible to review before
purchase.43 In this case, a potential licensee is asked to review the
agreement after buying the product and to indicate assent in some way.44
If the buyer does not agree to the terms, the product can be returned.45
Another type of mass market license agreement used in the
distribution of information technology is the click-wrap agreement.
Click-wrap agreements get their name from the shrink-wrap agreements
that preceded them.46 Click-wrap agreements display the license on a
computer screen and require the potential licensee to click or type “I
agree” to show acceptance of the terms before the product can be used.47
Thus far, courts have upheld these agreements.48 Despite the fact that
these different “wrap” style licenses have the same origin and serve the
same purpose, they have received disparate treatment from courts. This
is the focus of the next Part.

39. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1245–47 (1995). A license may prohibit a user from reselling the
product, copying the product, or decompiling the product. Id. at 1266–68.
40. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that the maker of a phone database program charged different prices and used different
licenses to target different segments of the market).
41. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 31, at 339–41.
42. See Spooner, supra note 38, at ¶ 4.
43. Id.
44. See Keohane, supra note 30, at 444–45.
45. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson supra note 31, at 340.
46. See Zachary M. Harrison, Note, Just Click Here: Article 2B’s Failure to
Guarantee Adequate Manifestation of Assent in Click-Wrap Contracts, 8 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 907, 912 (1998).
47. Keohane, supra note 30, at 445.
48. See Nimmer, supra note 10, at 42.
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III. CURRENT TRENDS IN THE LAW OF LICENSES
The cases concerning mass market licensing have done little to settle
the issue of their enforceability. Thus far, decisions considering the
issue of mass market licensing have hinged on competing applications of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).49 The cases concerning these
agreements “turn on whether the court finds that the parties formed their
contract before or after the vendor communicated its terms to the
purchaser.”50 Courts that prohibit mass market licenses consider the
contract to be formed at purchase, with the license constituting
additional terms.51 Courts that enforce mass market licenses view the
incorporation of the license as one step of a complex transaction.52
A. Cases Limiting Mass Market Licenses
Courts that have refused to enforce mass market license agreements
have done so under a UCC section 2-207, or “battle of the forms”
analysis.53 Section 2-207 of the UCC seeks to do away with the battle of
the forms or “last shot rule” in which the last party to send out terms in a
transaction gets to enforce those terms.54 Section 2-207 accomplishes
this by requiring express assent to any additional terms of a contract and
providing a default rule that binds parties only to terms that have
actually been agreed upon.55
In Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, the Third
Circuit refused to enforce a shrink-wrap license.56 Step-Saver had
ordered software from its producer over the phone. The software was
packaged with a shrink-wrap license that contained various warranty

49. Compare Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 100–06 (3d
Cir. 1991), and Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1337 (D. Kan. 2000),
and Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 762–66 (D. Ariz.
1993), with Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997), and ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996).
50. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
51. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 100–06; Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1337; Ariz.
Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 762–66.
52. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150; ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452–53.
53. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 100–06; Klocek, 104 F.Supp. 2d at 1340–41; Ariz.
Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 766.
54. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 99. The common law rule held that the offer and
the acceptance must mirror each other. If the terms of the acceptance did not match the
offer, the acceptance was considered a counteroffer. The practical effect of this rule was
that the side to send out the last offer, or “last shot,” before performance began, dictated
the terms of the deal because the final form sent out was considered the binding offer.
Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 105.
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provisions and a disclaimer of liability.57 When the product proved
defective, Step-Saver sued.58 The software producer claimed that the
license agreement barred the action.59
The issue in the case was whether the agreement was completed over
the phone or completed when the shrink-wrap was opened. The court,
applying UCC section 2-207, held that the transaction was completed
when the product was ordered over the phone and that the terms
included in the shrink-wrap license were additional and were never
assented to by Step-Saver.60
The more recent case of Klocek v. Gateway, Inc. provides another
example of how courts may use UCC section 2-207 to nullify a shrinkwrap license.61 Klocek purchased a computer from Gateway.62 The
computer came with a shrink-wrap license that included a clause
requiring arbitration of all disputes.63 The license indicated that the
customer’s failure to return the goods within five days signaled assent to
the license.64 Klocek kept the items for more than five days but
eventually sued for breach of warranty.65 Gateway contended that the
arbitration clause should be enforced.66
The court, applying Kansas’s codification of UCC section 2-207, held
that the agreed upon terms did not include the shrink-wrap license.67
The arbitration clause was found to be an additional term introduced by
Gateway after completion of the sale, to which Klocek had not shown
assent.68 The court also found that Klocek’s failure to return the goods
was not sufficient to show an express agreement to the terms of the
license.69

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 96–97.
Id. at 94.
See id. at 94–95.
Id. at 103.
Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340–41 (D. Kan. 2000).
See id. at 1334.
See id. at 1334–35.
See id. at 1335.
See id. at 1334.
See id.
See id. at 1341.
Id.
Id.
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B. Cases Validating Mass Market Licenses
1. Shrink-Wrap Agreements
Courts that have enforced shrink-wrap licenses relied not on UCC
section 2-207, but on UCC section 2-204(1).70 Section 2-204(1) states
that a contract can be formed in any manner that shows agreement.71
Courts upholding these licenses interpret section 2-204(1) to mean that
sellers can dictate how assent to the contract must be given.72 Applied to
shrink-wrap licenses, this means that the party offering the license can
dictate how a potential licensee should indicate assent to the license.73
A leading case validating mass market licenses is ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg.74 ProCD compiled and sold a computer database of phone
directories.75 ProCD marketed one version to businesses and another to
the general public at a lower price.76 The products were the same except
that the general public version came with a shrink-wrap license that
prohibited its use for commercial purposes.77 The license was
mentioned on the packaging and included in the user manual.78 The
license also appeared on the computer screen before the program could
be used.79 Zeidenberg bought a copy of the software and made it
available on the Internet for a fee.80 ProCD brought an action seeking an
injunction against further violations of the license.81
The Seventh Circuit treated UCC section 2-207 as irrelevant because,
in its view, a section 2-207 analysis requires at least two forms.82 This
transaction had only one form—the license.83 The court then applied
UCC section 2-204(1), finding that ProCD, as the party making the
offer, created a multi-layered transaction in which a consumer first buys
the product, can then review the license at leisure, and finally assents to
the contract by using the program.84 The court found that Zeidenberg
70. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (relying on the logic of
ProCD to defeat an argument based on section 2-207 of the UCC).
71. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (citing U.C.C. § 2–204(1)).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. 86 F.3d 1447.
75. Id. at 1449.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1450.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1452.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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assented to the terms of the license by using the software and had
subsequently violated the terms of the license.85
2. Click-Wrap Agreements
Click-wrap agreements have had an easier time gaining acceptance
than shrink-wrap agreements.86 There is less dispute about the
enforceability of click-wrap agreements because a click-wrap requires
the user to click on an “I agree” button in order to proceed, eliminating
the possibility that the license was not brought to the attention of the
consumer.87 Courts have found that click-wrap agreements are as
enforceable as any other written agreement, despite the fact that they are
mass market agreements.88
Though the issue has not yet been litigated, click-wrap agreements
would presumably survive a UCC section 2-207 analysis, as applied in
Step-Saver.89 A click-wrap agreement, appearing on the screen after the
buyer has purchased the product, could be seen as a sign of conditional
acceptance by the seller. To be complete, the contract would then
require the buyer’s express assent, in the form of a click, to the terms
dictated in the license agreement.90 Failure to assent would mean that no
contract was formed.91
IV. THE UCITA ON LICENSES
A. General Background of the UCITA
The Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA) is a set
85. See id. The Seventh Circuit expanded on its validation of mass market
licensing agreements in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. by enforcing an arbitration clause
similar to the one struck down in Klocek. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147,
1150–51 (7th Cir. 1997).
86. See generally In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341
(N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 47 USPQ (BNA) 1020
(N.D. Cal. 1998).
87. See Davidson, supra note 18, at 1184–85.
88. See In re RealNetworks, 2000 WL 631341, at *3 (holding that a click-wrap
license is a writing in the legal sense and enforcing an arbitration clause based on the
user’s assent); Hotmail Corp., 47 USPQ (BNA) at 1025 (enjoining a company from
sending out junk e-mail via Hotmail’s service because the defendant agreed to Hotmail’s
terms of service, assenting to a license agreement prohibiting junk e-mail).
89. See Keohane, supra note 30, at 450.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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of laws useful to commerce in digital technologies.92 It started as a joint
effort of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI) to create a new
article of the UCC, but due to disputes over the scope and content of the
rules, it was released solely by the NCCUSL in July 1999 as the
UCITA.93 The UCITA was created because of the difficulties in
applying the UCC (which was meant to apply to manufactured goods) to
digital information.94 The UCITA applies to computer information
transactions, including transactions involving information that can be
processed in or received from a computer.95 The UCITA is the first
general law to address the contractual issues raised by the information
economy.96
The UCITA is important to the discussion about the enforceability of
browse-wrap licenses because its aim is to create rules applicable to
digital technology. It includes provisions dealing explicitly with
licenses and assent in the digital realm. The provisions and policies of
the UCITA is instrumental in considering the debate over browse-wrap.
B. Specific Provisions of the UCITA
1. UCITA Section 112: Manifesting Assent; Opportunity to Review
Section 112 of the UCITA states that assent to a contract occurs when
a person, after having an opportunity to review the terms of the deal,
“authenticates the record” or engages in conduct that the person knows
92. See McDonald, supra note 27, at 462.
93. Id. The ALI and the NCCUSL worked together on the code for four years. Id.
The split was caused by difficulties in incorporating the rules for digital information into
the existing framework of the UCC. See Richard E. Spiedel, Revising UCC Article 2: A
View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607, 612–13 (2001). Though it is a murky
issue, the crux of the controversy seemed to center around whether certain provisions
favored by the software industry could or should be altered to conform with the existing
principles of the UCC. Id. Critics of UCITA believe that the split was caused by the
NCCUSL giving in to industry pressure and refusing to create rules that would work
with the UCC. See id. at 619. Whether this dispute between the ALI and the NCCUSL
reflects negatively on the UCITA is uncertain. See Alvin C. Harrell, UCITA:
Opportunity or Obstruction?, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 333, 335 n.5 (2000). As one
commentator pointed out, in the uniform law making process, disputes of this kind are
inevitable, and say little about the final product, “which necessarily must represent a
series of compromises between such divergent views.” Id. Today, two states, Virginia
and Maryland, have adopted versions of the UCITA. McDonald, supra note 27, at 467,
470.
94. See Nimmer, supra note 17, at 3–4.
95. Id. at 6 (explaining that a computer information transaction is one in which the
subject matter “information . . . is in, or is to be provided or created in, a form directly
capable of being processed in or received from a computer”).
96. Id. at 4.
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will signal assent to the other party.97 This concept of assent differs
from prior law in two important ways. First, the UCITA replaces the
traditional signature requirement with the idea of authentication.98 The
concept remains the same as under the traditional signature requirement,
but the UCITA broadly defines authentication as an execution or
adoption of an electronic symbol, message, or process referring to or
logically associated with the contract or an electronic record.99 Second,
the UCITA explicitly provides that parties can only assent to terms that
they have had a chance to review.100 This opportunity to review
“requires that a record be available in a manner that ought to call it to the
attention of a reasonable person.”101
According to the UCITA, assent by conduct occurs when a party acts,
or refrains from acting, with the knowledge that his or her action or
inaction will be taken as assent by the other party.102 A comment to the
UCITA cautions that determining when assent by action occurs requires
looking at the circumstances of the event.103 In short, the UCITA allows
for assent to be shown in any way as long as the assent is informed and
the agreeing party had a chance to review the terms of the deal.
2. UCITA Section 208: Adopting Terms of Records
Under section 208 of the UCITA, a party adopts the terms of a
contract once the party has shown assent to them. This provision
explicitly includes standard forms.104 UCITA section 208 further
dictates that once terms are adopted, they become part of the contract
regardless of the party’s knowledge or understanding of all of the terms,
barring fraud or unconscionability.105
The UCITA also supports the idea that contracts can be multilayered

97. U.C.I.T.A. § 112 (2001).
98. Id. cmt. 3(a).
99. Id. § 102(6)(B).
100. Id. § 112(a).
101. Id. cmt. 8.
102. Id. cmt. 3(b).
103. See id.
104. Id. § 208(1). The UCITA defines a standard form as “a record . . . containing
terms prepared for repeated use in transactions and so used in a transaction in which
there was no negotiated change of terms by individuals except to set the price, quantity,
method of payment, selection among standard options, or time or method of delivery.”
Id. § 102(a)(61).
105. Id. § 208 cmt. 7; see id. § 208(3).

1375

FINALSTREETER.DOC

2/3/2020 11:46 AM

and formed as part of a process, rather than all at one time.106 It
advances this idea by allowing for terms to be adopted after initial
performance has begun, as long as the parties involved had reason to
know that the agreement would be subject to later terms.107 In short, if
the parties have reason to know that the deal will be subject to later
terms that flesh out the contract, the additional terms should be treated as
if they were part of the initial agreement.108
A comment to UCITA section 208 explains the “reason to know”
standard for anticipating additional terms in a contract.109 According to
a comment to the UCITA, ‘“Reason to know’ . . . does not require
specific notice or specific language . . . . ‘Reason to know’ can also be
inferred from the circumstances . . . .”110
3. UCITA Section 209: Mass Market Licenses
The UCITA provision concerning mass market licenses, section 209,
stipulates that a party adopts the terms of a mass market license only if
the party assents before or during that party’s initial performance or
before initial access to the information.111 Terms are not adopted if they
are unconscionable or if they conflict with another expressly agreed
upon term.112 If a party does not have the opportunity to review the
terms before being obligated to pay for the information, the party is
entitled to return the product if the party does not agree with the
terms.113
The UCITA explicitly endorses the use of mass market licenses, but
limits their enforcement in three ways: (1) by requiring assent to the
terms, (2) by excluding terms that are unconscionable or against public
policy, and (3) by excluding terms that conflict with other agreed upon
terms.114
V. IMPORTANT ISSUES IN MASS MARKET LICENSING
The enforceability of mass market licenses has engendered a lot of
debate.115 Mass market licenses have come under attack from consumer
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See id. § 208 cmt. 3.
Id. § 208(2).
See id. § 208 cmt. 3(a).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 209(a).
Id. § 209(a)(1)–(2).
Id. § 209(c).
Id. § 209 cmt. 2.
See Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 547, 580 (1999).
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advocates who claim that these licenses put consumers at an unfair
disadvantage in the marketplace.116 Similarly, they have been attacked
on grounds that they are adhesion contracts that allow licensors to wield
too much power over consumers.117 Mass market licenses have also
been criticized on grounds that the actions required to show assent to the
licenses are unsatisfactory.118 All of these criticisms illustrate different
aspects of the same concern—that consumers need to be protected from
the unfair aspects of mass market licenses. In contrast, mass market
licenses have been defended based on freedom of contract principles.119
Understanding the various concerns over consumer protection from mass
market licenses, as well as the response from advocates of contractual
freedom, is essential to dissecting the debate over browse-wrap.
A. The Unfairness of Mass Market Licenses
Much of the criticism of mass market licenses has come from
commentators decrying the fact that consumers can be bound by terms
that limit liability or require arbitration simply by the consumer’s act of
clicking a mouse or opening a box.120 These arguments are based on
general issues of fairness as well as issues of contractual fair dealing, or
unconscionability.121 Critics claim that the long and sometimes onerous
terms included in license agreements create a basic unfairness due to
unequal bargaining power.122 In contract law, a term is procedurally
unconscionable if it is somehow hidden in the fine print of a contract in
such a way that the agreeing party is not put on notice of the term.123
116. See infra notes 120–31. Though it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
important to note that mass market licenses for computer software have been criticized,
and in certain cases nullified, for attempting to circumvent the laws of copyright. See
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that a
shrink-wrap agreement was preempted by federal copyright laws). See generally Apik
Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements,
45 UCLA L. REV. 569 (1997).
117. See Lemley, supra note 39, at 1286–89.
118. See Harrison, supra note 46, at 937–38; Nimmer, supra note 10, at 44–45.
119. See infra notes 152–57 and accompanying text.
120. See Harrison, supra note 46, at 938 (arguing that click-wrap licenses should
require more than a simple click to be valid); Lemley, supra note 39, at 1289 (arguing
that failure to return a product should not signify asset to shrink-wrap license terms);
Rustad, supra note 115, at 561–62 (describing consumer groups’ opposition to the
UCITA and mass market licenses).
121. See Lemley, supra note 39, at 1286–89.
122. Id.
123. See In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341, at *5 (N.D.
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For example, a term may be found to be procedurally unconscionable if
it is buried in the fine print of a long boilerplate contract. A contract
term may be found substantively unconscionable if it is too one-sided or
unfair, somehow representing an oppressive use of bargaining power.124
Though they do not deal with fairness by name, the cases refusing to
enforce mass market licenses illustrate court implementation of
consumer protection policy.125 In Klocek v. Gateway, the district court
in Kansas refused to enforce a shrink-wrap agreement on the grounds
that the license constituted an offer of additional terms that were never
assented to by Klocek.126 The court’s reasoning reveals the intent to
protect consumers. The court found that the terms of the contract
between Klocek and Gateway were set once the computer was delivered
and the terms of the shrink-wrap agreement were not objected to by
Klocek.127 The court reasoned that the inclusion of Gateway’s standard
licensing agreement with the box constituted additional terms. The court,
applying Kansas’s codification of UCC section 2-207, found that these
additional terms were only valid if the other party had reason to know
that the deal was dependent on the acceptance of the terms.128 The court
held that sending the license terms with the computer “did not
communicate to plaintiff any unwillingness to proceed without
plaintiff’s agreement to the Standard Terms.”129
The decision in Klocek means that in Kansas a seller cannot sell goods
and include additional terms with the delivery.130 Gateway can no
longer take a quick order over the phone and then ship the computer and
the terms to a customer, who could then go over the terms at length. To
enforce its standard license, Gateway must present all of its terms to a
consumer before delivering the goods. Presumably, to complete an
order over the phone, consumers must hear and agree to all of the terms
of a license before they can purchase a computer from Gateway. This
decision protects customers from unexpected terms, but it also increases
transaction costs by forcing all of the terms of the deal to be explained
and agreed to before shipment of the goods. This decision prohibits
“pay now, terms later” deals and protects customers from unexpected
terms, but it also creates inefficiency and limits the ways contracts may
Ill. May 8, 2000).
124. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2001).
125. See Step-Saver Data Sys, Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 104–05 (3d Cir.
1991); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000); Ariz. Retail
Sys., Inc., v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz. 1993).
126. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 1340–41.
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be formed. Given the problems this decision creates for companies
doing business in Kansas, it is apparent that the court’s policy objective
is consumer protection.131
Claims of unfair contracting in a license agreement were dealt with
more explicitly in In re RealNetworks, Inc., a case upholding a license
agreement.132 In this case, Mr. David Keel claimed that the arbitration
clause in the click-wrap license he agreed to before downloading free
software from RealNetworks was both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable.133 Keel claimed that the license was procedurally
unconscionable because it appeared in a pop-up window and the
arbitration clause was couched in fine print under the heading of
“Miscellaneous.”134 Keel also asserted substantive unconscionabilty,
claiming that the arbitration clause, which set the forum in
RealNetworks’ home state of Washington, was unfair due to cost and
distance.135 The court rejected the claim of procedural unconscionability
finding that the terms were not buried in fine print, but were presented in
the same size type as the rest of the license. The court also noted that
Keel had time to review the statement before agreeing because he could
have printed it out.136 As for the claim of substantive unconscionability,
the district court found that the terms of the arbitration clause were not
too onerous because the designation of any state as a forum is bound to
be inconvenient to someone if the corporation involved has a national
presence.137
The UCITA is in step with cases like In re RealNetworks in that it
relies on unconscionability and the public policy of protecting the public
from unfair mass market licenses. In a sense, the UCITA’s inclusion of
an explicit requirement that consumers be able to review the terms of a
deal before assenting to it codifies case law concerning procedural
131. The decision in Klocek is even more extraordinary, given that the court
invalidated an arbitration clause despite the heavy presumption towards validating
arbitration agreements. See Jeremy Senderowicz, Consumer Arbitration and Freedom of
Contract, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 275, 292 (1999) (noting the that Supreme Court
looks very favorably on arbitration clauses and will not scrutinize them without evidence
of fraud or coercion).
132. In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill.
May 8, 2000).
133. Id. at *5.
134. Id. at *5–6.
135. Id. at *6.
136. Id. at *5–6.
137. Id. at *6.
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unconscionability.138 The UCITA also includes guidelines for determining
when a term in a record is conspicuous.139 As for substantive unfairness,
the UCITA includes a provision that allows judges to strike down terms
that are unconscionable or terms that conflict with public policy.140 This
allows courts to do something about terms that they recognize as unfair
without resorting to legal hairsplitting or the scrapping of an entire
license agreement.
B. Mass Market Licenses as Adhesion Contracts
The rise of mass market licenses has also been criticized as an
unwanted increase in the use of adhesion contracts.141 An adhesion
contract is a form contract that is offered to buyers on a take it or leave it
basis, typically by a party with superior bargaining power.142 These
contracts do not involve any bargaining over terms and may be written
to maximize the benefits to the party offering the deal.143
Adhesion contracts are criticized because they allow parties in a strong
bargaining position to insist upon terms that may be unfair.144 Adhesion
contracts are nothing new.145 After all, a customer cannot call to order a
pizza that is advertised for ten dollars and then try to haggle the price down
to nine dollars. However, in terms of licensing, adhesion contracts are seen
as dangerous for consumers that, with a lack of choice and a lack of

138. Holly K. Towle & Brian Dengler, Contract Formation: Electronic Contracts
and Online Terms, in THE UCITA REVOLUTION: THE NEW E-COMMERCE MODEL FOR
SOFTWARE AND DATABASE LICENSING 131, 138 (PLI Intellectual Prop. Course,
Handbook Series No. G–600, 2000), available at WL 600 PLI/Pat 131. The drafters of
UCITA adopted a type of “heightened unconscionability standard” rather than coming
up with a laundry list of impermissible contract terms. Mary Jo Howard Dively &
Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Overview of Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, in
ADVANCED LICENSING AGREEMENTS FOR THE NEW ECONOMY 2001, at 201, 214–15 (PLI
Intellectual Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G–644, 2001), available at WL 644
PLI/Pat 201.
139. See U.C.I.T.A § 102(14) (2001). A term is conspicuous under the UCITA if a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Id. Conspicuous
also includes terms that are presented in contrast to the surrounding words by being of a
different color, of a larger size, or in all capital letters. Id.
140. Id. § 105(b).
141. See Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The
Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 354–55
(1999).
142. See id. at 324. Adhesion contracts are very common in everyday life. For
example, a lease for an apartment is usually an adhesion contract because the terms are
set in a standard form and most potential tenants are in no position to haggle over the
terms of the lease.
143. See id. at 325–26.
144. See id.
145. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 31, at 343.
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knowledge about licensing terms, could be locked into unfair licenses.146
Supporters of mass market licenses point out the fact that “the vast
majority of contracts in the United States are adhesion contracts.”147
Moreover, if given the option, it seems unlikely that consumers would
want to use time and resources to negotiate better terms for most mass
market agreements.148
Proponents of mass market licenses also point out that consumers are
better served by relying on unconscionability, consumer protection laws,
and competition within the market to protect them from unfavorable
terms.149 The Seventh Circuit took this position in ProCD by enforcing
ProCD’s shrink-wrap license, stating that “[c]ompetition among
vendors, not judicial revision of a package’s contents, is how consumers
are protected in a market economy.”150 This view is also represented by
the UCITA, which specifically endorses the use of mass market licenses,
but limits them by emphasizing public policy and requiring an
opportunity for the potential licensee to review the terms.151
C. Assent
Another reason that mass market licenses have come under fire
centers around contractual assent. Commentators and courts take issue
with mass market licenses because the typical forms of assent to mass
market licenses, namely opening a package or clicking a mouse, allow
consumers to unwittingly signify assent to contract terms.152 For
example, imagine a consumer who purchases a computer program that is
subject to a shrink-wrap license. The consumer takes the program home,
or if it was purchased over the Internet, receives it in the mail, and opens
the package with the intent of using the program. The consumer has
done what anyone would be expected to do—open the box—but he or
she has also consented to a shrink-wrap license. Critics argue that this is
dangerous for consumers who can become unknowingly obligated to
146. See Goodman, supra note 141, at 357.
147. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 31, at 343.
148. Id. at 344.
149. Id. at 345. Gomulkiewicz and Williamson point out that the software market
has been unforgiving of companies that try to push unfair terms on buyers. They note
that word spreads quickly among software buyers on the Internet. Id. at 345–46.
150. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996).
151. U.C.I.T.A. § 209 (2001). A comment emphasizes that standard form contracts
are valid under general contract law as well as under the UCITA. Id. cmt. 4.
152. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 141, at 354–55.
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license terms.153 Similarly, critics argue that a mouse click does not
adequately manifest intent to assent to license terms that limit liability or
force arbitration.154 In short, detractors of mass market licenses believe
that acts such as opening a box or clicking a mouse are not enough to
show assent to the often complicated terms of mass market licenses.
The opposite of the subjective idea that licensees can only be bound
by terms they know about is the idea of “objective assent.” The
objective assent view of contract formation stands for the idea that
people have a duty to read the terms of contracts, and any action that
shows assent binds the assenting party to all of the terms of the deal,
regardless of whether the terms were understood or not.155 The objective
assent view is almost universally accepted in contract law.156 In terms of
mass market licenses, objective assent means that potential licensees
have a responsibility to read and understand the terms of license. It also
means that they have the responsibility of understanding what acts will
constitute assent to a license. Cases upholding shrink-wrap and clickwrap agreements illustrate the objective assent concept by requiring
licensees to live up to the terms of licenses they have entered into
despite claims that they did not agree to the particular terms.157
The UCITA facilitates the objective assent model for mass market
licenses by supporting a flexible definition of assent and allowing
authentication through various means, from a simple click to the use of
the product.158 The potential unfairness of objective assent is tempered
by the UCITA’s requirement that consumers be able to review the terms
of licenses before assenting.159 The UCITA also softens the blow of
objective assent by emphasizing the role of unconscionability and public
policy as methods of nullifying unfair terms.160

153. Id.
154. See Harrison, supra note 46, at 937–38. Zachary Harrison suggested that
click-wrap licenses should require something more tangible to show assent, such as
typing out: “I assent to the terms of the license agreement.” Id. at 944; see also Nimmer,
supra note 10, at 44–45.
155. See Harrison, supra note 46, at 937.
156. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 192–96
(2d ed. 1998) (stating that the objective theory of assent is now universally accepted).
157. See In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341, at *6–7 (N.D.
Ill. May 8, 2000) (finding that an arbitration agreement in a click-wrap license is binding
because the licensee had a chance to review the terms of the deal and showed assent by
clicking).
158. See U.C.I.T.A. § 112 (2001); id. § 208; see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that terms contained in a shrink-wrap license
agreement were enforceable based on the licensee’s assent by using the product).
159. See U.C.I.T.A. § 112.
160. See id. § 105(b).

1382

FINALSTREETER.DOC

2/3/2020 11:46 AM

[VOL. 39: 1363, 2002]

Defense of Browse-Wrap Licenses
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

D. Freedom of Contract Versus Regulation
Arguments in support of objective assent in contract are closely
related to the idea that mass market licenses should be enforced on
freedom of contract principles. Freedom of contract is the idea that
people should be given “the dignity of being considered capable of
making and standing by their own agreements.”161 In terms of mass
market licenses, the freedom of contract principle stands for the idea that
sellers have a right to create licenses that require assent be given by
opening a box or clicking a mouse. The freedom of contract principle
also provides that consumers should be able to enter into these licenses
if they are so inclined and should be trusted to avoid entering into
agreements that are unfair.
ProCD exemplifies the freedom of contract principle as a justification
for enforcing a mass market license. The court in ProCD dealt with a
typical shrink-wrap license in which the buyer was asked to show assent
by using the software, or if not, to return the product. The ProCD court
found that the shrink-wrap license was valid.162 The court stated that the
principles of contract, codified in the UCC, permit contracts to be
formed in many ways.163 By finding the license valid, the court in
ProCD upheld the right of a party to propose a contract to a consumer in
a unique way, as well as the idea that consumers, as responsible people,
should be bound by the contracts they choose to form.
The argument in response to freedom of contract mirrors the
unfairness arguments discussed earlier. Detractors of mass market
licenses claim that consumers are at a bargaining disadvantage when
entering into licenses.164 Critics believe that this disadvantage in bargaining
is exacerbated by the pay now, terms later format used to create many
licenses. They argue that the format commonly used in shrink-wrap
licenses allows a consumer, who probably considers the transaction
complete when money changes hands, to be bound by a complex license
that can only be read at a later time.165 In short, critics of mass market
licenses believe that the unequal positions of the producers of
161. Lorin Brennan, The Public Policy of Information Licensing, 36 HOUS. L. REV.
61, 86 (1999) (“Some courts have declared freedom of contract to be a fundamental
right.”). Freedom of contract is also protected by Due Process. Id.
162. See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452.
163. See id.
164. See Goodman, supra note 141, at 356–58.
165. See id. at 354–55.
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information technologies and consumers make regulation of mass
market licenses preferable to freedom of contract.166
VI. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF BROWSE-WRAP LICENSES
There is little doubt that wrap style mass market licenses are here to
stay. Information technologies have already become an integral part of
the U.S. economy,167 in part because of the ease of contracting made
possible by standardized licensing agreements.168 Despite debates in the
courts or among commentators, wrap licenses have become the normal
way that contracts dealing with digital information are formed.169 The
use of browse-wrap as a way to form licenses is the next logical step in
the evolution of contracts in the information age.
A. Criticism of Browse-Wrap
Up to this point, browse-wrap has received little attention from
commentators or courts. The few courts dealing with browse-wrap have
found that it is not an enforceable way of forming a mass market
license.170 The holdings against browse-wrap have centered around
issues of assent, but the decisions also echo the same general policy
concerns that surround shrink-wrap and click-wrap licenses. The best
way to understand why browse-wrap has received such a poor reception
is to examine the rulings that have denied its enforceability.
In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., a New York district
court dealt with an invasion of privacy case that the defendant, Netscape,
claimed was subject to an arbitration agreement.171 The agreement to
arbitrate was contained in a license covering free software made
available by Netscape on its Web site.172 Specht had downloaded the
software from Netscape and later sued as part of a class action claiming
that the software invaded the privacy of its users by transmitting private
166. See Rustad, supra note 115, at 561–62.
167. See Nimmer, supra note 17, at 3.
168. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 31, at 341–43.
169. See Diane Duhaime, Legal Developments in Computer and Electronic
Contracting: Uniform Commercial Information Transaction Act, in FIFTH ANNUAL
INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 429, 434 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-00NC, 2001) (noting that is it common practice
for software to include agreements governing the use of the software), WL 662 PLI/Pat
429; Nimmer supra note 17, at 5 (stating that most computer information transactions
involve licenses or online access contracts).
170. See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 591–96
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 54 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1344,
1346 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
171. Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
172. Id. at 587–89.
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information.173 The software could be obtained by clicking a download
button on the Web site. Next to the download button was a hypertext
link advising users that they should read a license agreement before
downloading or using the software.174 The license could be displayed by
clicking the link.175 The license included a provision requiring any
disputes arising from use of the software to be settled by arbitration and
also stated that anyone who downloaded or used the software had agreed
to the license.176
The court’s analysis centered on the issue of whether users who
downloaded the software had truly assented to the license.177 The court,
after comparing the license to shrink-wrap and click-wrap, found that it
was a browse-wrap license.178 The court noted that while shrink-wrap
and click-wrap both include an action that shows unambiguous assent to
the license, the browse-wrap license used by Netscape allowed users to
get the software without performing such an action.179 The court found
that because users did not have to click “I agree” or open a box before
using the program, there was no evidence of a meeting of the minds as to
the license.180 In response to Netscape’s contention that the act of
downloading showed assent, the court found that because the users were
not given sufficient notice of the license, they had no reason to know
that their actions would constitute assent.181
A district court in California followed a similar line of reasoning in
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com., Inc.182 Ticketmaster ran a Web site
where people could buy tickets to a variety of events.183 The Web site’s
homepage displayed terms and conditions for the use of the site that
prohibited, among other things, the copying of information on the Web
site for commercial purposes.184 The terms also included a provision
173. Id. at 587. Specht claimed that the Netscape was involved in unlawful
electronic surveillance because the software allegedly transmitted information about the
user’s file transfer activity on the Internet. Id.
174. Id. at 588.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 588–89.
177. See id. at 591.
178. Id. at 591–95.
179. Id. at 595.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. 54 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1344 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
183. Id. at 1345.
184. Id.
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stating that anyone who went beyond the Web site’s homepage had
agreed to the Web site’s terms.185 Tickets.com copied information from
Ticketmaster’s Web site to use as part of its own ticket sales Web site,
prompting Ticketmaster to sue.186
The court found that the terms and conditions on the site were not
enforceable because users were not given proper notice of the terms and
therefore could not consent.187 In response to Ticketmaster’s contention
that the agreement made in this case was no different than a shrink-wrap
license, the court concluded that while shrink-wrap terms are “open and
obvious,” the terms at issue here were hard to find because users might
need to scroll to the bottom of the screen to read them.188
The decisions in Specht and Ticketmaster place great emphasis on
whether assent was given to the license terms. Both decisions turn on
the idea that the licenses could not have been valid without an act that
unambiguously signals assent to the terms. By requiring an act that
refers to assent and only to assent, the courts in these two cases are
seeking to protect consumers. This policy choice parallels decisions that
refuse to enforce shrink-wrap licenses because consumers are not
properly informed about the terms of the deal. In the browse-wrap
cases, the courts are supporting a policy that requires an explicit act of
assent from users so that users will not be unwittingly bound by terms.
The key question concerning the future of browse-wrap is whether this
policy of protection is necessary or beneficial.
B. A Defense of Browse-Wrap
In the words of Raymond T. Nimmer: “The world has changed.”189
There can be no question that the advent of digital technologies, such as
the Internet, and the resultant “death of distance”190 have changed the
way the world works. Today, people can buy almost any item from
anywhere in the world with the click of a mouse. The Internet has also
fostered new ways for people to contract for goods. Rapid change of

185. Id. at 1346.
186. Id. at 1345.
187. Id. at 1346.
188. Id.
189. Nimmer, supra note 10, at 5. Raymond Nimmer was Reporter to the Drafting
Committee on the UCITA and has written an award winning book on the law of
computer technology. See Nimmer, supra note 17, at 3.
190. The death of distance is the idea that new technologies have negated the
importance of geographic location and geographic difference. For example, the
communication enabled by the Internet allows companies to sell items to anyone in the
world in the same manner as to a neighbor. For a detailed discussion of the topic, see
generally CAIRNCROSS, supra note 1.
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this kind often brings about calls for regulation.191 The contracting
possibilities made possible by the Internet have brought about a desire
for the certainty and perceived safety of the status quo. This desire is
reflected in the Specht and Ticketmaster decisions that refuse to enforce
browse-wrap. But this is not a time to protect society from the new
possibilities of contracting tools, such as browse-wrap. As one expert
suggests, the market for information products should be regulated by
market forces, not fenced in by judicial protections of the public.192
Digital mass market licenses, such as browse-wrap and click-wrap, are
an example of the change brought about by new technology. The
prevalence of wrap-style licenses in today’s economy grew out of the
need for information products, which must be licensed to the public
affordably.193 Information products, such as software, must be licensed
in order to protect the investment of software producers. In order to sell
information products affordably to the mass market, the licenses must
also be standardized.194 Simply put, licenses are a necessary part of
business in the information marketplace. In turn, in order to get
information products with the ease and convenience of the Internet, it is
necessary to enter into a license over the Internet.
Consumers who take advantage of the Internet are faced with more
responsibilities because they now have the opportunity to assent to these
wrap-style licenses. It must be noted, however, that these are not new
responsibilities. These licenses are merely contracts and should be
enforced as such. Admittedly, dealing with a license for software is
more complicated and requires more responsibility than simply
purchasing a toaster. With a toaster, once you have left the store, the
deal is complete.195 Buying software requires the purchaser to read
terms about complicated things like arbitration and limited use, and may
even require the buyer to send the software back if the terms are
unsatisfactory. These added responsibilities are the price that must be
paid to reap the benefits of the digital age. Moreover, these
responsibilities are nothing new to contract law.
191. See Nimmer, supra note 10, at 6 (noting that there are no examples of when
calls for regulation have succeeded in the face of true economic and social change).
192. Id.
193. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 31, at 342.
194. See id.
195. Of course, this is not entirely true, considering that even a toaster will no doubt
include a warranty, the terms of which were unknown to the buyer when the purchase
was made.
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Browse-wrap licenses are not unlike typical contracts.196 In a browsewrap license, the offeror makes an offer of an information product, and
invites assent from a potential user of the product. With browse-wrap,
this assent is invited in the form of an action, like using the software that
allows the user to proceed into the interior of a Web site. Browse-wrap
is different from the other type of digital licensing tool, click-wrap, in
that the assent required in browse-wrap can be seen as ambiguous.
Though this is unique in the digital realm, the idea that an ambiguous act
can mean assent is by no means new to contract law. If a seller requires
acceptance be shown by the buyer nodding his head, that acceptance is
valid as long as the buyer had reason to know that his nodding would
bind him to the deal. People nod for many reasons, but if the buyer is
informed about the significance of the act, the deal is made. The same
should hold true for browse-wrap. If proper notice is given that the
potential licensee’s action of using the software to proceed into the Web
site will be seen as assent, then any contract formed by the assent should
be enforced. This should be so even if the assent is not given by an
explicit act provided solely for the purpose of assent, like clicking “I
agree.”
Despite the fact that assent to a contract can be shown in any number
of ways, browse-wrap has been invalidated because of the possible
ambiguity of the assent it requires.197 In both Specht and Ticketmaster,
the courts found that the browse-wrap licenses were not effective
because users had not clearly assented to them. If the issue is simply
one of notice of the terms, the problem can easily be fixed by making the
terms more noticeable. However, the holdings in these cases go deeper
than that. The court in Specht reasoned that a typical shrink-wrap license
allows for proper notice, but that the hyperlink mentioning the license
used by Netscape did not.198 It is hard to imagine how a sticker on a box
of software is any more or less conspicuous than a hyperlink. The courts
seem to be saying that explicit action is needed to form a license on the
Internet and that they will not enforce licenses formed by acts that could
be seen as ambiguous, such as going forward on a Web site or
downloading a program.
This stance runs up against a basic tenet of modern contract law,
namely, that assent can be shown in any manner necessary to show
196. In some ways, browse-wrap is more advantageous to the licensee than other
types of licenses because it allows users to review the terms before accepting, unlike
shrink-wrap, and it allows users to keep the license on their computer for later reference.
197. See Specht v. Netscape Communications, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 594–95
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 54 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1344
(C.D. Cal. 2000).
198. Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 595–96.
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agreement.199 This position can be explained by considering the main
policy behind limiting mass market licenses—consumer protection. The
courts in Specht and Ticketmaster upheld the proposition that these sorts
of licenses have important legal consequences and that people should not
be allowed to enter into them without manifesting assent in prescribed
ways, such as clicking a mouse. In this way, courts are protecting
consumers from the perils of contracting made too easy by the Internet.
This sort of protection is neither appropriate nor necessary. The
courts in these two cases have drawn an arbitrary line between licenses
that are formed by opening a box or clicking a mouse and licenses that
are formed by acts that may be considered ambiguous, such as
downloading software or proceeding into a Web site. However, browsewrap, when done properly, is no different than any other sort of mass
market license, or any contract for that matter. If users are given proper
notice that they are entering into a license, and if the terms are available
for review, the license should be enforced. An artificial distinction
between browse-wrap licenses and other wrap style licenses will limit
the way contracts can be formed over the Internet. By requiring a click
for a license to be valid, courts ignore the fact that people have a right to
form contracts in any way they choose. Moreover, this distinction
abandons the idea that people are bound by terms that they assent to,
whether they have read them or not.200
The distinction between browse-wrap and other types of licenses is
illogical, unnecessary, and potentially detrimental to the future
development of Internet commerce. No one knows the direction that
future technologies will take. When the Internet began gaining global
attention, a hands-off sentiment prevailed because it was thought to be
dangerous to burden the possibilities of the new technology with
unnecessary regulation.201 The same idea should apply to browse-wrap.
Courts may think that simply requiring a person to click “I agree” will
not make much of a difference. Today that might be true, but the future
is untold. Browse-wrap is not unlike other types of contracts and should
not be limited without first finding some fundamental reason for doing so.
199. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2001).
200. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 156, at 193–94.
201. See CURRIE, supra note 5, at 53. The U.S. government has outlined key
principles in its approach to the Internet, which include the idea that the private sector
should lead the growth of the Internet, that government should avoid undue regulation of
the Internet, and that government should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet.
Id.
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Confining Internet contracting in this way could have untold effects
on the future of contracting in the digital arena. One example might be
seen in the near future as electronic agents, or “bots,” become widely
used in the electronic marketplace. A bot is a software program that
automatically searches the Web for whatever it is programmed to find.202
There is considerable interest in using bots to act as agents that interact
with other bots to negotiate for goods using preset preferences, such as
price, quantity, and even bargaining strategy.203 In the near future,
consumers will be able to preprogram a bot to go out and find a specific
item. That “buyer bot” will interact with “seller bots” until a deal is
made.204 These interactions will be dependent on standardized forms—
no informed, affirmative negotiations will take place.205 If limitations
are placed on how consumers can enter into contracts now, this sort of
automated commerce could be jeopardized. If buyers are forced to agree
to licenses by clicking “I agree,” doing business through bots will be far
less efficient.
Limitations on browse-wrap are also misguided because consumers
can be protected from unfair licensing terms in many ways—ways that
do not chill the possibilities of contracting on the Internet. For example,
consumers can rely on unconscionability, the contract maxim that
agreements are to be construed against the drafter, and consumer
protection laws.206 Consumers are also protected by the forces of the
market.207 This is particularly true with Internet commerce where
information about unfair dealing is never in short supply.208 Of course,
202. Brennan, supra note 161, at 111. An example of a simple bot is a program that
allows a user to type in the name of a music CD and then the bot retrieves the prices for
that CD from all of the merchants on the World Wide Web. Id. at 113. The UCITA
already anticipates the use of electronic agents in commerce. The UCITA defines an
electronic agent as: “a computer program, or electronic or other automated means, used
independently to initiate an action, or to respond to electronic messages or performances,
on the person’s behalf without review or action by an individual at the time of the action
or response to the message or performance.” U.C.I.T.A. § 102(27) (2001).
203. See Brennan, supra note 161, at 112–14. A buyer bot could be programmed to
emulate various moods, varying, for example, between “anxious, cool-headed, and
frugal.” Id. at 113.
204. Id. at 113–14.
205. See id. at 114–15.
206. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 31, at 345. It is also important to
note that not all mass market licenses seek to take advantage of consumers. Though it is
tempting to assume that licenses are one-sided and designed to give the maximum
advantage to the licensor, some licenses actually give users of software more rights than
are legally required. See Brennan, supra note 161, at 87 (discussing a software license
that grants users rights beyond those provided by copyright law).
207. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 31, at 345. The protection of the
market was also a major factor in cases upholding shrink-wrap licenses. See ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
208. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 31, at 345–46 (noting that
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Internet consumers will be best protected by their own caution and good
sense.
Following the same logic, the UCITA rejects the idea of overt
regulation as an unnecessary restraint on commerce.209 The UCITA’s
broad take on assent in contracting validates the forms of assent that are
used for browse-wrap. That is, by basing assent on authentication,210 the
UCITA makes it possible for licenses to be created in any way intended
by the parties to form the license. The UCITA does not really break new
ground in this regard; it merely “codifies and clarifies” the common
law.211 This view of assent is tempered by the requirement that a
licensee have a chance to review all terms before assent can be given.212
The UCITA also relies on unconscionability to address any unfairness
created by mass market licenses.213 The UCITA also allows judges to
strike down licensing terms that conflict with public policy.214 In
summation, the UCITA endorses flexibility in assent that allows people
to make full use of the possibilities for doing business on the Internet,
while relying on the pressures of the market and the pre-existing checks
on unfairness to protect consumers.
VII. A SUGGESTION TO COURTS AND LEGISLATURES
The state of uncertainty concerning the enforceability of licenses is
incongruent with the reality of today’s marketplace, where mass market
licenses are a fact of life. This situation can best be rectified by
legislative action. Although states may be wary of passing the UCITA
in its entirety,215 it is important that state legislatures consider passing
legislation that explicitly recognizes the enforceability of wrap-style
licenses. By doing so, lawmakers can remedy any confusion that exists
software users have formed organizations to monitor and influence licensing terms
offered by software companies and that criticism on the Internet is “swift, blunt, caustic,
and spreads quickly”).
209. See Nimmer, supra note 17, at 4.
210. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(6) (2001); id. § 112 cmt. 3.
211. Nimmer, supra note 10, at 43.
212. See U.C.I.T.A. § 112 cmt. 8.
213. Id. § 111.
214. Id. § 105(b).
215. Two states have passed the UCITA into law. Virginia adopted almost the
whole code, see McDonald, supra note 27, but Maryland adopted its own version that
included some added measures of consumer protection. See id. at 470–72. For example,
the Maryland version requires that notice to license terms be available before and after
assent is given to a license. Id at 472.
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concerning these licenses and create a uniformity of rules to help foster
Internet commerce.216 Any legislation should also include a definition of
assent that is flexible enough to allow for assent to be shown in many
ways. This should include the forms of assent typical to browse-wrap.
Any proposed legislation for mass market licenses should also follow
the lead of the UCITA by endorsing the use of public policy
considerations to nullify unfair terms in licenses.
If states are slow in enacting the necessary legislation, it will be up to
the courts to solidify the position of mass market licenses. Courts
should make it a point to treat browse-wrap licenses just as they treat
any other sort of license. Courts must allow browse-wrap licenses that
give proper notice to consumers to be enforceable regardless of how
they are formed. These licenses should only be invalidated if they are
objectionable on basic contract principles, and then only using existing
means of protecting consumers, such as unconscionability. Browsewrap should not be deemed entirely unenforceable simply because it is
new.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Shrink-wrap and click-wrap already play a central role in mass market
licensing; browse-wrap is simply the next step in the process. The
artificial distinctions made between browse-wrap and the other wrapstyle licenses is an attempt to hold back the tide of progress in the name
of consumer protection. Information technology has made the contracts
entered into by the general public more sophisticated, but there is no
reason to believe that consumers cannot handle these added
responsibilities. Accordingly, it is time for the courts to treat the public
as sophisticated players in their own commercial lives. Browse-wrap
licenses are new in form but not in substance.
In the end it may not be important whether courts require licenses
created on the Internet to include the clicking of “I agree,” but the future
of electronic commerce is uncertain. In the past decade, information
products available over the Internet have increased tremendously in both
type and number. As this growth continues, the need for flexibility in

216. On the need for uniformity and clarity in electronic commerce, see Nimmer,
supra note 17, at 5–6. Nimmer states:
The need for clarity is vivid in electronic commerce. Online systems have
changed how transactions occur and many information transactions are
performed. Yet many issues in contracting online are unanswered. A modern
contract law must provide guidance on those issues and many others; failure to
do so does not foster, but impedes, commerce in computer information.
Id. at 6.
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contracting will grow as well.217 Limiting the way that contracts can be
formed over the Internet at this point is illogical, unnecessary, and could
have a potentially dangerous chilling effect on the future of electronic
commerce.

DAN STREETER

217.

See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 31, at 362.
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